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ABSTRACT 
 
Blood products represent valuable medical assets and also serve as critical resources in public 
health emergency response. In the United States, such products – which may include red blood 
cells, platelets, and plasma – originate almost exclusively from voluntary donors and traverse a 
complex regulatory pipeline before being put to therapeutic use. Despite the clinical importance 
of blood, however, the U.S. lacks a clear protocol for handling blood products during 
emergencies, particularly with respect to bloodborne viral threats. This investigation parsed 
scientific literature, federal and non-governmental policies, news articles, Congressional records, 
and publicly available surveillance data in order to elucidate the model of blood product 
management in the U.S. and assess its efficacy in the event of a public health emergency. This 
approach demonstrated that current blood product management policies in the U.S. appear to be 
sufficiently effective on a day-to-day basis. However, they fail to address several notable 
challenges associated with public health emergencies: lack of coordination between emergency 
management agencies, screening of donors and donations, blood distribution, healthcare worker 
availability and endangerment, and the financial impact of therapeutic blood use. The study 
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concludes with recommendations for improving the blood product management infrastructure in 
the U.S., thereby strengthening its overall emergency response capability. 
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me with infinite love and support. My parents’ phone calls were especially comforting during 
late-night writing sessions, as were their reminders to make health and happiness my number-one 
priorities. Special thanks also go to my little brother, Saagar, for delivering world-class pep talks 
every week over the phone. My relatives graciously invited me home during breaks and took 
wonderful care of me despite my constant preoccupation with school. I am grateful for their 
hospitality and promise to be a better guest next time. 
To my teachers, colleagues, and friends in Pittsburgh: you are too numerous to name 
individually, but you know who you are. Know that I am inspired by your commitment to service 
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however, mention the members of my essay committee, Professors Jeremy Martinson and Gerald 
Barron, and thank them for lending me their time and considerable expertise this year. My 
sincerest thanks also go to my outstanding advisor, Dr. Anthony Silvestre, for his advice in all 
matters school-related, his thoughtful suggestions for the execution of this project, and most of 
all, for his valuable lessons in mindfulness and meditation. 
Finally, I must convey my deepest gratitude to the phenomenal people at the Center for 
Biosecurity of UPMC. My summer at the Center was an exceptionally fulfilling one, and I was 
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truly humbled by everyone’s kindness and encouragement. I am especially grateful to Ryan 
Morhard for patiently helping me navigate the intricacies of policy analysis, and to Nidhi Bouri 
for introducing me to the issue of blood product management. It is due largely to the Center’s 
guidance that I can present this research as the culminating endeavor of my graduate studies. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Blood is a specialized form of connective tissue responsible for performing several functions 
critical to good health: transporting oxygen and nutrients, circulating hormones, removing 
metabolic waste, facilitating the immune response, and maintaining body temperature and pH. It 
is perhaps unsurprising, then, that blood and its associated components – notably, red blood cells 
(RBCs), platelets, plasma, and cryoprecipitate – represent important medical commodities. 
Unlike most commodities, however, they originate exclusively from voluntary donors and cannot 
be stockpiled for more than a few weeks. These limitations yield significant consequences for 
managing public health emergencies, defined here as “an emergency need for health care 
[medical] services to respond to a disaster, significant outbreak of an infectious disease, 
bioterrorist attack or other significant or catastrophic event.” 1 As a result, American medical 
institutions constantly wrestle with the considerable challenges of maintaining a safe and 
adequate reserve of blood products, and distributing them efficiently to high-need locations. 
Surpassing even the problems of blood product collection and allocation, though, is the 
issue of safety. Healthcare professionals must ensure that blood products are compatible with 
their recipients’ tissues in order to prevent harmful immune complications. The process of 
collecting blood further highlights the difficulties associated with ensuring recipient safety, since 
blood and its derivatives are notoriously susceptible to contamination by a variety of bacterial, 
viral, parasitic, and fungal pathogens. For the same reason, intravenous drug users (IDUs), 
 2 
individuals who engage in unprotected sex, and healthcare workers (HCWs) in clinical or 
laboratory settings are particularly susceptible to infection by blood-transmissible pathogens via 
needlestick injury or contact with contaminated blood. Given these risks, the U.S. government 
has created a complex regulatory framework to preserve the safety of blood products collected 
for therapeutic purposes. However, the lack of coordination among the supervising bodies within 
this framework may impede efforts to ensure a concerted response to pathogens in the American 
blood reserve; notably, viruses and other pathogens responsible for emerging infections in the 
U.S. Public health emergencies affecting the availability and safety of blood products further 
magnify this weakness. 
The primary goal of this investigation is to underscore the importance of proper blood 
product management and shed new light on the larger issue of public health preparedness with 
respect to infectious pathogens. It relies, therefore, on information assembled from scientific 
literature, public laws, government reports, federal policies, and publically available surveillance 
data to accomplish several objectives. First, it provides a brief discussion of the burden 
associated with bloodborne infections in the U.S. Given the sheer diversity of the microbes 
responsible for such infections, the study pays special attention to three of the most prevalent: 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C virus (HCV). 
Next, the study traces the evolution of the federal and non-governmental policies that govern 
blood product safety, evaluates their strengths and weaknesses, and analyzes their posited 
efficacy in mitigating the consequences of a public health emergency. Finally, the study offers 
policy recommendations that aim to improve blood product management, thereby augmenting 
public health response capacities in the U.S. 
 3 
2.0  METHODS 
This study began with preliminary searches of the PubMed database, which filtered results to 
include only open-access articles published within the last five years and exclude those studies 
not involving human subjects. The searches contained the following terms: 
 
 “blood product distribution” (256 results) 
 “blood product screening” (1274 results) 
 “blood products and public health emergencies” (20 results) 
 “blood shortage” (292 results) 
 “occupational exposure and bloodborne pathogens” (363) 
“bloodborne viruses” (101 results) 
 
A brief analysis of the literature revealed that most recent studies on blood product 
research are biomedically oriented. A subsequent repeat of these searches in Google Scholar 
using the same criteria produced similar results. These searches revealed a dearth of publications 
focusing on the logistics of the blood product supply chain and blood safety policies. Therefore, 
this investigation, which assumes the form of a policy analysis examining blood management 
practices in the U.S., ultimately drew from several diverse sources. These include, but are not 
limited to: 
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 Peer-reviewed publications 
 News articles 
 Government reports 
 Federal guidelines pertaining to blood management and emergency management 
 Congressional records 
 Publicly available surveillance data 
 
Specific questions considered while parsing these sources include: 
 
 What are the governing bodies that formulate blood product management policies? 
 What measures are taken to ensure blood product safety? 
 How are blood products distributed? 
 Under what circumstances does the demand for blood products increase? 
 Who are the stakeholders involved in ensuring emergency preparedness? 
 What are the specific criteria for adequate preparedness (with respect to blood products)? 
 
Synthesis of the information gathered from the aforementioned sources explicated the 
American model of blood product acquisition and delivery. The study then extrapolated the 
implications of this model to encompass the challenges associated with managing public health 
emergencies and draw conclusions about its effectiveness. 
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3.0  TRANSFUSION-TRANSMITTED VIRUSES 
Bloodborne viruses present significant medical, social, and economic threats to populations 
worldwide; among these, HIV, HBV, and HCV are the most prevalent in the U.S. Despite the 
fact that infection by these viruses is often preventable by simple prophylactic measures such as 
wearing condoms, using clean needles, or – in the case of hepatitis B – getting vaccinated, many 
new cases continue to emerge every year. Because lengthy, asymptomatic periods of incubation 
often precede HIV, HBV, and HCV infections, those infected often remain unaware of their 
carrier status, during which time they may inadvertently transmit the virus in question to healthy 
individuals. In fact, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation postulates that this figure is as high 
as 20% for HIV-positive individuals in the U.S. 
2
 New cases also emerge as a result of contact 
with infected body fluids, needlestick injury, or vertical (i.e. mother-to-child) transmission. 
Even when symptoms of HIV, HBV, and HCV infections manifest, they are often 
nonspecific and not exclusive to the pathogens in question. Acute, early-stage HIV infections, for 
example, resemble mononucleosis-like syndrome during the first few weeks of infection, causing 
fevers, pharyngitis, and rashes; after recovering from these ailments, patients often remain 
asymptomatic for periods ranging from months to years. 
3
 Although HIV disease is primarily an 
affliction of the immune system, the infection permeates nearly every system in the body, 
precipitating a broad array of symptoms and afflictions. These may include cancer, blood cell 
depletion, endocrine disorders, gastrointestinal dysfunction, neuropathies, dementia, and 
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pulmonary complications. 
2 
Individuals in later stages of the disease also become dangerously 
susceptible to a variety of opportunistic infections, including hepatitis, malaria, tuberculosis, and 
pneumonia. 
Acute, early-stage hepatitis B and C are characterized by mild, flu-like symptoms such as 
fatigue, vomiting, nausea, and fever; in addition to these, muscle aches, joint pains, and 
tenderness in the left upper abdominal quadrant often accompany HCV infections. 
4, 5
 In their 
chronic manifestations, however, HBV and HCV infections produce far graver sequelae: major 
immunosuppression, insulin resistance, renal inflammation, vitiligo, thyroiditis, and jaundice. 
6
 
The severest consequences of hepatitis infections include cirrhosis, or the degradation of liver 
tissue, and hepatocellular carcinoma, a rare form of liver cancer. 
3.1 DEMOGRAPHICS 
Disease surveillance is a time-consuming, resource-intensive, and costly endeavor. Due to the 
clinical and financial burdens associated with transfusion-transmitted viral infections, federal 
health authorities nevertheless recommend that state and local health agencies conduct 
surveillance to more effectively track disease and inform health disparity reduction efforts. As 
dictated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), new HIV infections and 
existing AIDS cases are reportable conditions in all fifty states, along with incident hepatitis B 
and C infections. 
7, 8
 Chronic hepatitis infections, however, present a significant surveillance 
challenge to public health authorities. CDC reports, “Although previously not included among 
nationally notifiable conditions, the public health importance of chronic viral hepatitis infections 
dictates that they be added. Several states and counties have established viral hepatitis infection 
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databases for persons testing positive for [hepatitis B antigen] or anti-HCV, but their experience 
indicates that managing large numbers of [hepatitis B antigen]-positive and anti-HCV positive 
laboratory reports has the potential to overwhelm a surveillance system and divert scarce 
resources into data management rather than disease prevention.” 9 Therefore, current 
approximations of hepatitis prevalence in the U.S. are likely vast underestimates, leaving the true 
burden of HBV and HCV infections unknown. In light of these surveillance shortcomings, CDC, 
must therefore rely on data from several national surveys as parameters by which to quantify the 
burden of viral hepatitis: the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Racial and 
Ethnic Approaches to Community Health, and the National HIV Behavioral Surveillance 
program. 
10
 
Based on data acquired from the above sources, the CDC approximates that there are 
1,148,200 known cases of HIV infection (in individuals over the age of 13) in the U.S. as of 
December 2012, including an estimated 207,600 who were unaware of their status. 
11
 These 
figures are compounded by roughly 50,000 new infections every year, many of which emerge 
among young black men (ages 13-24). 
11
 Overall, white, black, and Hispanic men who have sex 
with men [MSMs] consistently report the highest rates of infection, followed by heterosexual 
black women. 
11
 Hepatitis B incidence, on the other hand, has steadily declined over the past 
decade; nevertheless, the CDC received clinical reports of 19,982 acute cases between 2006 and 
2010. 
12
 Similar reports for hepatitis C during the same period showed a relatively constant 
incidence rate of (0.3%), for a total of 4,159 acute cases. 
13
 However, given the inconsistency of 
current surveillance efforts and the extended incubation periods associated with these infections, 
it is safe to conclude that these figures are, in fact, underestimates of the true burden of hepatitis 
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in the U.S. The CDC conjectures that the total number of hepatitis B and C cases emerging 
between 2006 and 2010 actually number 203,000 and 87,000, respectively. 
14
  
The distribution of hepatitis infections also varies by gender, ethnicity, and age. Men 
typically report higher rates of HBV and HCV acquisition, as do individuals of black, American 
Indian, and Asian descent; as of 2010, the U.S. Caucasian population also saw a slight increase 
in the number of emergent hepatitis C cases. 
15, 16  
The CDC also reports a shift in the age 
distribution of hepatitis C carriers between over the past several years: during the early 2000s, 
adults between ages 40 and 49 demonstrated the highest incidence of new infections, but they 
were eventually surpassed in 2005 by individuals in their twenties and thirties. 
17
 Hepatitis B, on 
the other hand, is now seen most frequently in the 30-39 and 40-49 demographic groups, with the 
number of incident cases in the 20-29 age cohort dropping dramatically since 2002. 
18
 
3.2 ECONOMIC IMPACT 
The depletion of human capital is a major factor contributing to the economic burden associated 
with infectious disease. This phenomenon is especially apparent when considering bloodborne 
pathogens such as HIV, HBV, and HCV, since these viruses deal a disproportionately severe 
blow to populations of younger individuals in their prime years of economic productivity. The 
40,000 new HIV infections in the U.S. in 2002, for example, are expected to accrue over $36.4 
billion in lifetime expenditures, with black, white, and Hispanic Americans generating the 
majority of these costs. 
19
 These figures, which account for direct medical spending, mortality-
associated productivity losses, and ethnicity-specific costs, result in an average of $910,800 
spent over the lifetime of an HIV patient in the U.S. 
19
 However, because they did not account 
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for morbidity-related productivity losses, it may be inferred that these numbers are still 
underestimates of the true economic burden of HIV infections. 
Hepatitis B and C infections incur similarly high costs, which vary depending on the 
stage of disease progression. In 2000, for example, outpatient treatment for symptoms of acute 
HBV infection in the U.S. cost $272 per incident, while hospitalization resulted in charges 
exceeding $8,000. 
20
 A 2008 cost analysis, however, demonstrated that liver complications 
stemming from later-stage, chronic hepatitis B can generate medical costs amounting to nearly 
$60,000, while the cost of a liver transplant may run as high as $163,438. 
20 
Meanwhile, 
researchers project that the economic burden associated with HCV infections will exceed $10.7 
billion in direct medical costs between 2010 and 2019, while society will bear over $54 billion in 
economic losses due to premature mortality during the same period. 
21
 
 
10 
4.0 THE AMERICAN BLOOD RESERVE 
The American blood reserve consists predominantly of pints (units) of whole blood and its 
associated derivatives: RBCs, platelets, plasma, cryoprecipitate, and granulocytes. Certain blood 
banks and collection agencies such as the American Red Cross (ARC) and America’s Blood 
Centers (ABC) isolate and store other blood products, including leukocytes, umbilical cord 
blood, stem cells, bone marrow, and mononuclear cells. 
22, 23 The U.S.’ Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that ARC and ABC operations each generate roughly 45 
percent of the nation’s blood supply, while the Department of Defense (DoD), hospitals, and 
independent blood banks collect the remaining 10 percent. 
24
 The Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS), the U.S.’ emergency repository of pharmaceuticals, antidotes, vaccines, and medical 
supplies, also contains cytokines and hematopoietic growth factors. 
25
 These are accessible under
Emergency Use Authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the agency that 
enforces safety guidelines for food, medical equipment, biologics, and pharmaceuticals. 
25
 The
aforementioned blood products each serve various clinical purposes and require different storage 
conditions (see Table 1). 
11 
Table 1. Frequently used blood products and their associated shelf lives and clinical uses. 26 
Blood Product Shelf Life Clinical Use 
Mode of 
Collection 
Whole blood 35 days 
 Hypovolemia
correction
 Exchange transfusions
 Treatment of acute
blood loss
Venous donation 
RBCs 42 days 
 Treatment of anemia
 Treatment of acute
blood loss
Erythrocytapheresis; 
fractionation 
Platelets 5 days 
 Treatment of
thrombocytopenia
 Management of bone
marrow failure
 Surgical prophylaxis
 Treatment of acute
blood loss
Plateletpheresis; 
fractionation 
Plasma 1 year 
 Correction of
coagulation factor
deficiencies
 Correction of
immunodeficiencies
 Reversal of warfarin
effect
Plasmapheresis; 
fractionation 
Cryoprecipitate 1 year 
 Treatment of
hemophilia
 Treatment of Von
Willebrand disease
 Source of fibrinogen
Apheresis; fractionation 
12 
The following section analyzes the contents of the American blood reserve 
further, discussing their origins, their availability, and the costs associated with their use 
in clinical and emergency settings. 
4.1 BLOOD PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 
Given that the American blood reserve depends predominantly upon voluntary donations, its size 
and availability fluctuate constantly. Despite seasonal shortages during the summer and winter 
months, GAO nevertheless reported in 2002 that the amount of blood in the American reserve 
remains “generally adequate.” 24, 27 AABB, a U.S.-based standards organization in the field of
transfusion medicine, corroborates these findings. Its National Blood Collection Utilization 
Survey (NBCUS), conducted in 2008 with sponsorship from FDA, CDC, the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), actually 
reported a significant surplus of blood nationwide, with the number of units available exceeding 
the number of units transfused by a margin of over two million. 
28
 In light of the challenges
associated with managing surplus blood supplies – storage logistics, safety issues, and financial 
constraints, to name a few – GAO recommends that blood product repositories strive to maintain 
minimally sufficient levels of inventory at all times (i.e. a three-day supply). 
24, 29
In 2008, American blood collection agencies amassed a total of 17,286,000 units of blood 
(prior to testing). 
28
 NBCUS further reports that these agencies also acquired over 11 million
units of non-RBC components (platelets, plasma, cryoprecipitate, and granulocytes). 
28
 Hospital-
based blood banks collected an addition 17,286 units of blood, of which 127 were discarded 
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upon testing. 
28
 Of these assorted blood products, NBCUS found that transfusion patients 
received roughly 15 million units of RBCs and whole blood and 2 million units of platelets over 
the course of the year. 
28
 Several organizations – notably, ARC, AABB, and ABC – coordinate 
blood exchanges and track available inventory to facilitate the movement of blood products to 
high-need locations.  
Thus, given the apparent abundance of blood products in the American reserve and the 
frameworks in place to deliver those products, it is clear that the challenge of blood product 
management lies not in acquiring additional products on a day-to-day basis. Rather, the problem 
lies in the ability of hospitals and blood centers to collect, test, and distribute blood efficiently 
when confronted with an event that could potentially endanger the blood reserve: infectious 
disease outbreaks, natural disasters, or man-made disasters. 
4.2 AMERICAN BLOOD DONORS 
As described above, blood products are perishable medical commodities that originate 
exclusively from willing donors. Although a number of synthetic blood substitutes exist – 
notably, artificial hemoglobin products – their safety and therapeutic efficacy remain unclear. 
GAO further estimates that while 60 percent of Americans are eligible to donate blood, only 
about 5 percent actually do so; furthermore, 80 percent of eligible, active contributors are repeat 
donors. 
24 
Thus, the sufficiency of the American blood reserve is contingent upon a small but 
critical sector of the population. 
NBCUS indicates that a total of 10,805,000 individuals (out of 19,330,000 individuals 
who presented to donate) successfully gave blood. 
28
 Of these, roughly 30 percent were first-time 
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donors and 10% belonged to an ethnic minority group (i.e. African, Asian, and/or Hispanic). 
28
 
Collection agencies and hospitals deferred 2,428,000 individuals (12.6 percent of those who 
presented) for various reasons: low hemoglobin levels (59.3%), high-risk behavior (2.9%), 
traveling to certain locations (7.9%), and other medical conditions (29.9%). 
28
 Collectors also 
discarded 127,000 units obtained from 1.2% of donors after they tested positive for certain 
disease markers (see section 4.3). 
28 
4.3 BLOOD PRODUCT SCREENING AND PROCESSING 
As delineated by the American Medical Association, the process of ensuring blood product 
safety consists of five tiers: donor screening, maintaining accurate donor deferral registries, 
blood testing, quarantining blood donations until they are cleared for therapeutic use, and 
monitoring adverse events during donation and transfusion. 
30
 FDA is predominantly responsible 
for enforcing these guidelines and modifying them as needed. As a result of implementing and 
adhering to these measures, blood banks help ensure that the American blood reserve is safer 
now than ever before. 
Among the aforementioned tiers, blood testing, normally a two-day process, is arguably 
the most critical step in ensuring the safety of both the blood and the recipients of blood 
transfusions. FDA mandates that all collection agencies test blood for the presence of HBV, 
HCV, HIV, human lymphotropic virus I and II (HTLV-I/II), and syphilis. In addition to these, 
ARC also screens its blood products for Chagas disease, West Nile Virus (WNV), and is 
working to develop an effective test for dengue virus. 
31,
 
32
 AABB members, meanwhile, conduct 
nine different tests on their donations. 
33
 FDA currently holds licenses for the various diagnostic 
 15 
assays these agencies use to test whole blood and its associated components. 
34
 HBV tests, for 
example, include three assays for detecting HBV surface antigens, one for HBV core antigen, 
and two nucleic acid tests (NATs) for HBV itself. 
34
 HCV tests, meanwhile, include three assays 
for HCV encoded antigen and three NATs for the virus itself. 
34
 Tests for HIV-1 and HIV-2 are 
the most numerous, encompassing some 29 antibody assays (including an at-home detection kit 
and an oral test) and 10 NATs. 
34
 Additional diagnostics include two antibody assays HTLV-I/II, 
two antibody assays for Trypanosoma cruzi (a parasitic protozoan responsible for Chagas 
disease), two RNA assays for WNV, and three multiplex assays capable of simultaneously 
screening blood for combinations of HIV, HBV, and HCV. 
34 
All of these tests feature high 
sensitivities, which may occasionally result in false positives (i.e. a test indicates that a unit of 
blood is reactive when it is, in fact, pathogen-free); therefore, donors whose blood appears to be 
reactive may undergo more specific confirmatory testing to verify the original results. 
33
 
However, despite their sensitivity, these tests are not failsafe. HBV antigens, for example, are 
undetectable in blood until 30 to 60 days after infection; levels of HBV antibodies in the blood 
may even diminish over the course of several decades. 
35
 As a result, HBV-positive individuals 
who are unaware of their carrier status pose a considerable threat to blood product security, 
particularly during the early stages of infection. HCV and HIV pose similar challenges to blood 
screening efforts. 
36
 
Another important component of ensuring blood safety is the process of screening 
potential donors. Given that the aforementioned diagnostic strategies are not perfectly reliable, 
coupling blood tests with a behavioral questionnaire represents a more effective way of ensuring 
blood product safety. According to FDA, preliminary screening via questionnaire eliminates as 
many as 90 percent of unsuitable donors before they commence donation. 
37
 Blood collection 
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agencies must add the names of deferred donors to a registry, which other agencies cross-check 
to ensure they do not obtain donations from disqualified donors. 
37
 If the reason for deferral is a 
temporary health issue such as anemia, low body weight, or exposure to vaccinia virus, the donor 
in question may once again give blood after a specified deferral period. 
38
 Other criteria for 
deferral include exposure to another person’s blood, needlestick injuries, recent tattoos or body 
piercings, or relations to an individual with Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (CJD). 
39
 Sexual contact 
with any of the following individuals may also serve as a basis for deferral: IDUs, MSMs, those 
who were born or lived in Africa, those who have had sex in exchange for money, hemophiliacs, 
or HIV-positive individuals. 
39
 Collection agencies may also reject donors who have lived in the 
United Kingdom or France after 1980 due to concerns about the transmission of variant CJD. 
39
 
4.4 THE ECONOMICS OF BLOOD BANKING 
Despite the fact that the majority of American blood products originate from unpaid volunteers, 
there are still significant costs associated with using these valuable commodities in a therapeutic 
setting; transfusions alone, for instance, cost the healthcare industry between $10 and $15 billion 
annually. 
40
 Similarly, moving blood products through medical supply chains also generates 
significant costs. ARC’s blood management infrastructure, for example, consists of several 
critical steps: collecting blood from a donor, shipping donations to a laboratory for testing and 
processing, storing viable blood products, shipping said products to designated distribution 
centers, and finally, distributing blood products to medical institutions in need. 
41
 Unsurprisingly, 
steep costs accompany each step in ARC’s supply chain, a phenomenon also observed in the 
schemes of other distributors. 
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Hospitals receiving blood from a nonprofit blood bank such as ARC do not pay for the 
blood itself, but instead must cover the costs of laboratory screening and shipping. 
42
 NBCUS 
reports that the cost of most blood products in 2008 (except for whole-blood derived platelets 
and fresh frozen plasma) had significantly increased since 2006. 
28
 The cost of a single unit of 
RBCs in 2008, for instance, averaged $223.09, while a single unit of leukoreduced apheresis 
platelets cost hospitals a mean of $538.56. 
28 
Meanwhile, the price of fresh frozen plasma, 
cryoprecipitate, and whole-blood-derived platelets averaged $57.78, $65.10, and $64.98, 
respectively. 
28
 Fractionation, the process by which laboratories separate blood into its 
component parts, further compounds the overall cost of blood products: one study estimates that 
the additional costs generated by such processes run as high as $600 million in the U.S. alone. 
43
 
Finally, the costs of new safety procedures also contribute to the escalating cost of blood 
products; leukoreduction, for instance, increases the cost of a single unit of blood by $30. 
44
 
Although the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reimburses hospitals 
for the purchase of select blood components – as much as 83% of the cost of RBCs and 93% of 
the cost of whole-blood derived platelets, on average – large hospitals making high-volume 
purchases of blood products nevertheless accumulate significant expenses. 
28
 Furthermore, in 
2012, CMS slashed reimbursement rates for several products: whole blood (reimbursement 
reduced by 5.95%), split units of blood (44%), RBCs (3.34%), granulocytes (11.11%), and 
irradiated platelets (11.26%). 
45
 Such changes in reimbursement policies are sure to increase the 
economic burden associated with caring for transfusion recipients. 
In addition to these benefits from CMS, the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 
a division of HHS, runs a Definitive Care Reimbursement Program for victims of public health 
emergencies that are “transported via Federal assets, processed through a FCC, and referred to 
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facilities or practitioners for Definitive Medical Care. The NDMS tracks all patients who are 
transported via Federal assets and thus, are eligible for coverage under this program.” 46 The 
program thus compensates healthcare providers for approved medical services performed on 
eligible patients who sustain “injuries or illnesses resulting directly from a specified public 
health emergency; injuries, illnesses and conditions requiring essential medical services 
necessary to maintain a reasonable level of health temporarily not available as a result of the 
public health emergency; or injuries or illnesses affecting authorized emergency response and 
disaster relief personnel responding to the public health emergency.” 46 Because CMS 
reimburses healthcare providers for blood products through Medicare and Medicaid, NDMS, 
may thus play a crucial role in mitigating the financial repercussions of public health 
emergencies. 
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5.0  BLOOD PRODUCT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
The practice of blood banking in the U.S. began in earnest in the 1930s and forties, following 
reports of successful blood transfusions on the battle lines of World War II. 
47
 In light of these 
successes and other medical advances such as the invention of the plastic blood bag and the 
discovery of sodium citrate as an anticoagulant, blood transfusion quickly evolved into an 
important therapeutic measure on the civilian medical front as well. However, following the 
emergence of more blood banks and a steady increase in cases of bloodborne infections, this 
trend soon underscored the need for more stringent blood product regulation. During the early 
days of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic in the U.S., for instance, 
the blood banking industry emerged as a crucial vector of bloodborne pathogens. 
Today, authorities from FDA, HHS, CDC, DoD, and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) have formulated a number of policies intended to safeguard the American blood 
reserve from pathogenic threats. Additional regulatory support originates from several non-
governmental organizations; namely, AABB, ARC, ABC, and independent blood banking 
agencies across the country. The following section offers a synopsis of the major events and 
organizations that gave rise to today’s blood management practices, and discusses the role of 
these groups in shaping today’s blood regulation policies. 
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5.1 FEDERAL POLICIES 
The federal policies governing blood product safety, distribution, and management span the 
jurisdictions of several agencies; notably, HHS, FDA, CDC, and DoD. Each of these agencies 
maintains standards for reducing the incidence of blood-transmissible viral infections and 
ensuring the safety of blood products overall. In order to more effectively guide the activities of 
these and other groups during times of crisis, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), a division of DHS, formulated the National Response Framework (NRF) to replace its 
earlier National Response Plan. The core of NRF describes the roles and responsibilities of 
groups involved in emergency response and recovery activities, the organization of response 
personnel, and planning resources for national, state, tribal, and local entities. 
48
 The NRF also 
identifies fifteen emergency support functions (ESFs), detailed protocols that structure these 
activities further. ESF #8, which delineates procedures pertaining to emergency response in the 
realms of public health and medicine, is of particular import to blood product management. 
Other notable federal policies include 2006’s Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(PAHPA), which aims to improve the U.S.’ medical response capabilities with respect to 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) threats. 
49
 Under the provisions of 
PAHPA, federal policymakers also established the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA), which in turn coordinates stockpiling activities and 
countermeasure acquisition at the national level. The Public Health Service Act, another federal 
law passed in 1944, defines a medical countermeasure as follows: 
 
“…A drug (as that term is defined by section 321(g)(1) of title 21), biological 
product (as that term is defined by section 262(i) of this title), or device (as that term is 
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defined by section 321(h) of title 21), that the Secretary determines to be a priority 
(consistent with sections 182(2) and 184(a) of title 6) to - (i) diagnose, mitigate, prevent, 
or treat harm from any biological agent (including organisms that cause an infectious 
disease) or toxin, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent that may cause a public health 
emergency affecting national security; or (ii) diagnose, mitigate, prevent, or treat harm 
from a condition that may result in adverse health consequences or death and may be 
caused by administering a drug, biological product, or device that is used as described in 
this subparagraph.” 50 
 
Arguably, blood products are lifesaving medical countermeasures as defined by these 
criteria. However, neither PAHPA, nor the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of 2002, nor BARDA’s Strategic Plan for 2011-2016 make any explicit 
mention of blood products, nor do they offer any guidance for blood product management during 
public health emergencies. Instead, the various agencies described below jointly shoulder the 
task of coordinating blood product distribution during such events. 
5.1.1 Department of Health and Human Services 
HHS is a cabinet department within the U.S. government that works closely with state and local 
agencies, with the goal of “protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human 
services.” 51 As the federal government’s principal manager of healthcare operations, HHS 
encompasses numerous divisions responsible for facilitating healthcare delivery nationwide; 
notable among these are CDC, FDA, and NIH. As specified in ESF #8 and its Public Health 
Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) Strategy, FEMA tasks HHS with 
assuming “operational control of Federal emergency public health and medical response assets, 
as necessary, in the event of a public health emergency”; in this capacity, HHS is responsible for 
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spearheading efforts aimed at ensuring the availability and safety of medical countermeasures 
against CBRN agents (including blood products). 
52, 53
 During public health emergencies that 
elevate the demand for blood products, HHS liaises with AABB to assess the situation at hand, 
evaluate supply chain sufficiency, and determine the optimal course of action for allocating 
available products. 
54
 
In order to fulfill its NRF-mandated obligations, HHS maintains an Advisory Committee 
on Blood and Tissue Safety and Availability, established in 1997. This committee reports 
directly to the Secretary of HHS and its activities span the domains of biovigilance, transfusion 
ethics, transplantation standards, and the economics of biologics acquisition, processing, and 
distribution. HHS has also developed the Blood Availability and Safety Information System 
(BASIS), an online tool that monitors blood supplies at participating medical institutions across 
the country. As of August 2007, there were nine blood centers and 101 hospitals sharing 
information with BASIS; these data include statistics on adherence to transfusion safety 
practices, delays in product delivery, and the effects of shortages. 
54
 Another critical component 
of HHS operations is NDMS, which consists of various emergency response teams charged with 
deploying civilian medical teams and supplies to areas overwhelmed by a disaster. 
55
 
HHS has also developed further plans in an effort to improve the safety of patients and 
HCWs, with respect to the threat of blood-transmissible viruses. In its 2011 strategy to reduce 
the burden associated with viral hepatitis, for example, it proposes to improve technologies used 
to perform viral screening, augment biovigilance initiatives nationwide, and tighten restrictions 
on blood, organ, and tissue donor eligibility. 
10
 The Obama administration’s National HIV/AIDS 
Strategy (released in 2010) also designates HHS as a key participant in its plan to achieve greater 
coordination in the federal response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
56
 However, the effectiveness of 
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these plans and their integration into the existing framework for emergency blood product 
allocation remain to be determined. 
5.1.2 Food and Drug Administration 
FDA, a subsidiary of HHS, also plays a key role in blood product management, focusing 
particularly on issues of safety and licensure. Of FDA’s various divisions, its Vaccines, Blood 
and Biologics group handles issues relating to blood product safety. This group includes the 
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), which is responsible for “the collection 
of blood and blood components used for transfusion or for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals 
derived from blood and blood components, such as clotting factors, and establishes standards for 
the products themselves.” 57 In this vein, CBER is also charged with enforcing safety regulations 
pertaining to donor eligibility, educating donors about the risks associated with bloodborne 
pathogens, and managing licenses for plasma products, infectious disease tests (including those 
for HBV, HCV, and HIV), and blood phenotyping reagents. 
58, 59
 
As the principal administrative body for biologics in the U.S., FDA maintains strict 
oversight over the blood banking industry, conducting biennial inspections of all blood product 
facilities and holding blood product manufacturers to the same quality control standards as those 
of pharmaceutical industrialists. 
37
 FDA is also closely involved in matters affecting blood 
product security, providing general directions for managing said products during power outages 
and severe weather events. However, individual blood banks reserve the authority to manage 
such incidents as they see fit, with FDA serving as a source of information and assistance if 
called upon: “Blood establishments collecting and storing blood and blood components generally 
have written procedures in place to address emergency circumstances. Problems or issues 
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affecting the blood supply should be brought to the attention of the FDA.” 60 It is critical to note 
that the aforementioned guidelines pertaining to emergency blood product management are not 
compulsory, nor do they “create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to 
bind FDA or the public”; in fact, FDA welcomes alternate strategies, provided they satisfy 
“applicable statutes and regulations.” 35, 36 
FDA has also released a number of guidance documents over the years intended both for 
its staff and the blood banking industry. These documents describe advances in blood product 
analysis and drug manufacturing, offer recommendations for the proper implementation of new 
technologies, contain strategies for minimizing the risk of bloodborne infections, and include 
guidelines to follow when screening for select pathogens. 
61
 One such document, for example, 
provides blood banks with deferral guidelines to implement in the event that a donor presents 
with multiple positive HBV NAT results. Given the relative non-specificity of this test, FDA 
recommends that blood banks refrain from discarding the reactive donation and instead reserve it 
for producing plasma derivatives as opposed to performing an allogeneic transfusion. 
35
 FDA 
proposes additional, extensive parameters for screening blood donations for HCV. In the event of 
positive HCV NATs, for instance, FDA recommends that the blood bank look back into the 
donation history of the individual in question for further indicators of HCV infection; this 
strategy is also prescribed when a donation yielding negative NAT results still generates positive 
HCV antibody tests. 
36
 
Current FDA guidelines are especially stringent with respect to testing blood donations 
for HIV. During the early stages of the AIDS epidemic in the U.S., scientists and public health 
officials struggled to pinpoint the various routes by which people acquired HIV infections. 
Although they soon identified unprotected sex as a significant mode of HIV transmission, the 
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emergence of new cases in hemophiliacs, infants, and recipients of blood transfusions indicated 
that HIV was a blood-transmissible pathogen. As a result, the blood banking industry was 
suddenly confronted with intense scrutiny and criticism. CDC officials at the time favored 
implementing stricter deferral guidelines barring gay men, Haitians, and IDUs from donating 
blood; however, this recommendation met with considerable resistance. 
62
 The National 
Hemophilia Foundation, for example, fretted over the implications of connecting what was still 
considered a gay man’s disease to the contamination of Factor VIII, a clotting protein isolated 
from blood and used to prevent hemorrhaging in hemophiliacs. 
62
 Gay community leaders, on the 
other hand, condemned the deferral guidelines as civil rights infringements. Doctors, too, 
worried about potential blood shortages stemming from the ban since gay men made significant 
contributions to the nation’s blood reserve. 62 Furthermore, FDA resented CDC’s apparent 
intrusion into their jurisdiction, believing that CDC “had taken a bunch of unrelated illnesses and 
lumped them into some made-up phenomenon as a brazen ruse to get publicity and funding for 
their threatened agency.” 62 Today, however, in cognizance of the various routes of HIV 
transmission, FDA’s donor deferral policies extend to MSMs, IDUs, those who have taken 
money or drugs in exchange for sex, and those who have engaged in sex with the aforementioned 
individuals, among others. 
58
 
5.1.3 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
While HHS, FDA, DHS, and DoD focus predominantly on creating and enforcing safety 
policies, CDC, another subsidiary of HHS, participates directly in many of the biovigilance 
initiatives that ensure blood product security and keep health authorities appraised of the burdens 
associated with blood-transmissible pathogens. CDC’s Division of Healthcare Quality 
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Promotion, for example, maintains an Internet-based surveillance program known as the 
National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN). Like BASIS, NHSN enrolls healthcare facilities 
nationwide on a voluntary basis, and assists them in reporting adverse events such as hospital-
acquired infections, identifying epidemiological trends, pooling public health data, and sharing 
best practices. 
63
 The Biovigilance Component of NHSN includes a Hemovigilance Module, 
which enables healthcare facilities to log and track errors, near misses, and adverse patient 
reactions during blood transfusions. 
64
 
In addition to compiling data on transfusion-related incidents through NHSN, CDC also 
directly monitors the safety of blood products themselves using two additional surveillance 
strategies: the Universal Data Collection (UDC) system and the Thalassemia Data and Blood 
Specimen Collection (TDC) project. Through UDC and TDC, CDC screens hemophiliacs and 
thalassemia patients for bloodborne pathogens that could potentially endanger the blood supply, 
such as HIV, the hepatitis viruses, and WNV. 
65
 Doing so enables CDC to “to detect known and 
emerging infections that could be transmitted through the frequent blood transfusions required by 
people with the severe anemia caused by thalassemia.” 65 CDC also maintains a repository of 
sera from participants in UDC and TDC screening initiatives, which facilitates future outbreak 
investigations. In 2004, for instance, analysis of the serum samples in this repository helped 
researchers determine the route of transmission for parvovirus B19, a bloodborne virus 
responsible for a common childhood rash. 
65
 
Although CDC is not an official lawmaking body, it does collaborate with working 
groups in various government offices to ensure timely, effective responses to outbreaks with 
potential consequences for blood product safety. Among these are the Public Health Service 
Blood and Tissue workgroup and the Blood, Organ, and Other Tissue workgroup, in addition to 
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several other pathogen-specific workgroups. 
65
 In accordance with Presidential Decision 
Directive 39, CDC, with support from HHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has also 
created the Laboratory Response Network (LRN). 
66
 LRN is a coalition of international, national, 
state, and local laboratory facilities charged with providing technical support during chemical or 
biological emergencies, thereby augmenting the U.S.’ overall laboratory capacities. 66 CDC also 
maintains strong working relationships with its federal counterparts; namely, FDA, as well as its 
cabinet department, HHS. 
5.1.4 Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 
DHS and DoD operations are critical to maintaining the integrity of the American blood reserve. 
By and large, DHS plays a supervisory role with respect to blood product management during 
emergencies, focusing on the proper execution of ESF #8 and coordinating emergency mitigation 
activities at the federal, state, and local levels. DHS’ major contributions to emergency 
management at the national level include developing the National Inventory Management 
System (NIMS) in 2004. NIMS, a framework for managing disasters of all scopes, represents a 
standardized approach to addressing public health emergencies, including blood product 
shortages or distributional challenges. 
DoD, meanwhile, engages more directly in managing the flow of blood products from 
donors to recipients. In order to support the operations of its Military Health System, for 
example, DoD established an Armed Services Blood Program (ASBP) in 1952, which today 
collects blood donations from select blood centers across the nation, as well as from locations in 
Japan and Germany. 
67
 These donations, which are intended exclusively for military families and 
members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, traverse a regulatory pipeline separate from the 
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blood product delivery system serving civilian communities. ASBP feeds newly acquired units 
of blood through its whole blood processing laboratory, after which they enter an Expeditionary 
Blood Transshipment System (an Air Force-staffed module responsible for distributing blood 
products to detachment units), which in turn forwards the blood to military hospitals, navy ships, 
support groups, and first responders. 
68, 69
 DoD employs FDA-licensed software, the Defense 
Blood Standard System (DBSS), to manage the logistics of processing donors, collecting blood, 
managing inventory, and testing blood products. 
70
 Like BASIS, DBSS supports “lookbacks for 
infectious disease reporting requirements” and may play a significant role in analyzing blood 
product supply chains and safety in the event of an emergency. 
70
 A 2001 memorandum penned 
by the Inspector General of DoD, however, reported that DBSS “was not adequate to meet all 
user and mission needs of the Armed Services Blood Program” and “could adversely affect asset 
accountability, increase the workload at Blood Program Organizations, increase the risk of blood 
inventory errors, and could possibly result in the inappropriate release of blood products.” 71 
DoD has also instated several military-specific policies to ensure blood product security 
with respect to blood-transmissible viruses, which inflict a growing burden on servicemen and 
women. Given the military’s vaccination policy for new recruits, the prevalence of HBV in the 
military blood supply is extremely low. HIV and HCV, however, pose a more substantial risk. In 
1999, the American Forces Press Service reported that less than 1% of 20,000 military officers 
tested positive for HCV, a figure roughly one third of the national average at the time. 
72
 Initially, 
DoD attributed the low prevalence of hepatitis C to stringent military screening measures. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2012, the Marine Corps Times reported 2,700 new cases of HCV 
infection among armed service members emerging between 2000 and 2010, while the Veterans 
Health Administration system tallied 170,000 chronic hepatitis C patients and an additional 
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4,800 receiving combination drug therapy for their infections. 
73
 DoD’s stance regarding HIV 
infections, meanwhile, correspond with the National HIV/AIDS strategy. Specifically, its 
Directive 6485.1 prevents the military from recruiting HIV-positive individuals and mandates 
biennial screenings for all personnel. 
74
 Therefore, armed service members who test positive are 
often disqualified from future deployments since “the protection of the military blood supply is 
of utmost importance. War and major battles require large quantities of blood and ‘battlefield 
transfusions’ may be required.” 75, 76 This directive also bars infected service members from 
donating blood, organs, or tissues, and also permits military and civilian blood banks to trace 
medical histories to discover potential cases of bloodborne viral transmission. 
77
 
In addition to ensuring the safety of the military blood supply, DoD plays an important 
role in addressing infectious disease outbreaks on a global scale. Its Armed Forces Health 
Surveillance Center, responding to President Clinton’s Directive NSTC-7 in 1997, established a 
division known as the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (GEIS). 
GEIS is meant to “centralize coordination of surveillance efforts conducted through DoD 
overseas medical research and development laboratories… Additionally, all host country partner 
activities are directed toward improvement of each country's diagnostic and reporting 
requirements in accordance with World Health Organization's International Health Regulations 
(2005) core capacities.” 78 GEIS thus serves as a mechanism by which DoD can integrate its 
blood supply regulatory activities with ongoing global efforts. 
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5.2 NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS 
While the U.S. federal government is predominantly responsible for overseeing blood product 
management, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian groups play 
critical roles in the actual acquisition and dissemination of blood products. Because these groups 
often interface directly with the recipients of medical resources – patients, medical institutions, 
and communities in need – they are uniquely situated to optimize blood product safety standards 
and distribution. The following section explores the scope and impact of blood product 
management policies in the private and nonprofit sectors. 
5.2.1 AABB 
AABB (founded in 1947 as the American Association of Blood Banks) is a professional body 
dedicated to upholding the technical and ethical standards associated with blood banking, 
transfusion medicine, and various cellular therapies in the U.S. In that capacity, it supports 
numerous education and training endeavors for aspiring healthcare professionals, in addition to 
offering technical assistance to medical institutions internationally. AABB also coordinates a 
number of activities aiming to augment the U.S.’ biovigilance capabilities, assess the quality and 
availability of the American blood reserve, and provide timely assistance to disaster victims.  
AABB’s Interorganizational Task Force on Biovigilance monitors blood, organ, and 
tissue safety initiatives by collecting data through several extensive bio- and hemovigilance 
networks. Working in conjunction with HHS, CDC, and the U.S. Biovigilance Network, it helps 
run the hemovigilance module of NHSN, which allows participating healthcare facilities to 
evaluate their performances with respect to the safety of transfusion recipients. 
79
 AABB also 
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maintains its own module within NHSN, the Transfusion Safety Group, which provides enrollees 
with data analysis services and recommendations for implementing best practices. 
79
 Due to 
confidentiality statutes, however, CDC cannot inform AABB which medical institutions enroll in 
NHSN; instead, if a hospital wishes to make use of AABB services, it must notify AABB of its 
enrollment in the system. 
80
 The Donor Hemovigilance System, on the other hand – a separate 
unit representing collaboration between AABB, HHS, ASBP, ABC, ARC, and Blood Systems, 
Inc. – tracks blood donor safety by soliciting records of adverse events from participating 
institutions. 
81
 AABB also founded the National Blood Data Resource Center (NBDRC), which 
encourages further participation from and research collaboration (including NBCUS) between 
individuals and institutions working in the field of transfusion medicine. 
82
 
Furthermore, AABB is currently working to add two new components to its arsenal of 
biovigilance strategies: one, a system tracking complications stemming from cellular therapies 
such as stem cell transplants; and the other, a system monitoring adverse events resulting from 
tissue transplants. 
83 
In addition to surveying the safety of blood donors and recipients through 
these systems, AABB also presides over several pathogen-specific surveillance initiatives. For 
example, it collaborates regularly with various governmental committees to formulate policies 
concerning transfusion-transmitted pathogens. Viruses of interest include HIV, hepatitis A virus, 
HBV, HCV, cytomegalovirus, and HTLV-I/II; other diseases of interest include babesiosis, 
Lyme disease, malaria, and CJD. 
83
 AABB also features two biovigilance networks that focus 
exclusively on tracking WNV and T. cruzi. 
84, 85
  
Supplementing AABB’s various biovigilance initiatives is its work in the realm of 
disaster mitigation. AABB defines a disaster as  
 
 32 
“any domestic disaster or act of terrorism that: suddenly requires a much larger amount of 
blood than usual, temporarily restricts or eliminates a blood collector’s ability to collect, 
test, process, and distribute blood, temporarily restricts or prevents the local population 
from donating blood, restricts or prevents the use of the available inventory of blood 
products requiring immediate replacement or re-supply of the region’s blood inventory 
from another region, or creates a sudden influx of donors requiring accelerated drawing 
of blood to meet an emergent need elsewhere.” 86  
 
In response to these potentially ruinous consequences, AABB has set up a National Blood 
Exchange (NBE), a non-profit operation that facilitates the sharing of blood resources in the 
event of a shortage. Since its inception, NBE has coordinated the distribution of 185,000 units of 
blood annually. 
87
 AABB has also created the Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic 
Disasters and Acts of Terrorism (ITF), a professional coalition comprised of representatives from 
various public- and private-sector groups. Federal members of ITF include HHS, CDC, FDA, 
and ASBP, while non-governmental affiliates include ARC, ABC, AdvaMed, the American 
Hospital Association, Blood Centers of America, the College of American Pathologists, the 
National Marrow Donor Program, and the Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association. 
88
 During an 
emergency affecting the blood supply, AABB convenes the ITF to determine the most efficient 
way to distribute blood to high-need locations via NBE, based on information procured from 
local blood collection agencies. 
88
 The guidelines structuring ITF’s subsequent recommendations 
are codified in AABB’s Disaster Operations Handbook, a manual describing protocols relating to 
preparedness, blood product transportation, donor and volunteer management, and coordination 
with government agencies. The manual also includes contingency guidelines to follow in the 
event of specific natural or man-made disasters (including biological attacks and influenza 
pandemics). In support of this work, FDA has granted AABB a two-year contract entitled “Rapid 
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Data Collection for Response to Bioterrorism, Emerging and Pandemic Agents Threatening the 
Blood Supply,” which charges AABB with developing “rapid data collection tools for blood 
centers to identify, quantify and reduce risks to the blood supply during such disasters.” 80 
Although AABB maintains extensive protocols for handling blood supply-related 
emergencies, local blood centers nevertheless report problems responding to such events, citing 
difficulties in “obtaining fuel for generators to collect and maintain blood supplies, emergency 
vehicles to distribute blood with a limited shelf-life, or reliable access to emergency 
communications.” 89 In light of these lingering shortcomings, AABB works with DHS and HHS 
to make blood product safety and distribution a higher priority for local emergency management 
agencies, encouraging them to forge stronger working relationships with medical institutions and 
blood banks, and submit disaster operation plans to FDA. 
90
 
5.2.2 American Red Cross 
ARC is a nonprofit humanitarian organization that acquires and distributes blood products, offers 
health education and training to volunteers and HCWs, and provides disaster relief services to 
affected communities worldwide. ARC occupies a unique niche among American nonprofit 
agencies, operating under a Congressional charter delineating federally mandated 
responsibilities: “[fulfilling] the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, to which the United 
States is a signatory, assigned to national societies for the protection of victims of conflict, 
[providing] family communications and other forms of support to the U.S. military, and 
[maintaining] a system of domestic and international disaster relief, including mandated 
responsibilities under the National Response Framework coordinated by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.” 91 In this capacity, ARC plays a critical role in stocking the national 
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reserve, collecting roughly 45% of the U.S.’s blood products and supplying some 3,000 hospitals 
nationwide. 
24, 92 
With approximately 80% of donations solicited through mobile, community-
based blood drives, and another 20% originating from ARC centers, patients in need receive 
blood from ARC at no cost. 
92
 In order to ensure continuity in the blood supply pipeline and 
comply with FDA safety guidelines, ARC also conducts testing on all the donations it collects. 
Standard tests currently screen for HBV, HCV, HIV, Chagas disease, HTLV-I/II, syphilis, and 
WNV; meanwhile, efforts to develop an effective test for dengue virus are ongoing. 
32, 93
 
In addition to collecting and screening blood, ARC maintains an elaborate system for 
delivering blood to high-need locations. Its thirty six domestic blood service regions evaluate 
their inventory daily and provide hospitals with blood products as needed, and work with NIMS 
to locate scarce or unavailable components in other regions. 
94
 Once a hospital files a request for 
blood, and ARC staff members locate the products of interest, the products are delivered via car, 
van, truck, bus, air courier service, or, in the event of a pressing emergency, helicopter. 
94
 The 
U.S. Army also assists ARC in return for support of ASBP initiatives: “When it does not 
interfere with the military blood program, it is the general policy of the Army to cooperate with 
the Red Cross and to support the blood program by assisting with mobile unit visits to Army 
installations and encouraging Army members to voluntarily donate blood when feasible.” 95 
FDA oversees ARC activities relating to blood product management, and reserves certain 
legal powers over such operations. In 2003, for example, officials from both organizations 
agreed to the terms of an Amended Consent Decree (“the Decree”), a document outlining legal 
parameters for handling blood products. In order to promote greater operational efficiency and 
ensure the safety of ARC-processed blood, the Decree compels ARC to identify and discontinue 
all obsolete operating procedures, assess the impact of those procedures on blood product safety, 
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review protocols relating to the use of equipment for collection and screening, improve record 
management, uphold stricter standards for tracking adverse events during the donation process, 
and revamp its employee training program. 
96
 Failure to comply with these FDA-mandated 
guidelines has proven to be costly to ARC since the issue of the Decree, generating nearly $46 
million in fines since 2003. 
97
 These infringements, which span both managerial oversights and 
improper handling of blood products, are as follows: 
 
“The violations range from understaffing, inadequate staff training, and delayed logging 
of donations, to ineffective screening of donors, failure to add new donors with infected 
blood to the national list of deferred donors, failure to share information on deferred 
donors between facilities, and failure to quarantine and recall infected blood units. Other 
lapses include failing to notify health departments when donated blood was found to have 
been infected with HIV, Hepatitis C, or the West Nile virus, failing to promptly alert 
healthcare facilities when expired or infected blood had been distributed, failing to 
register adverse donor reactions as a result of giving blood, and incorrect labeling of 
blood products. In addition, the FDA cited the Red Cross for poor quality assurance, 
including keeping blood products out of controlled storage for more than 30 minutes, a 
backlog of approximately 18,000 donor management cases, and insufficient record-
keeping. Regulators claim the organization allowed employees with no medical training, 
certification, or experience to serve as Medical Directors in charge of reviewing donor 
complications, and permitted staff to ‘perform tasks they did not understand.’ In some 
cases, employees failed to identify permanently deferred donors who previously gave 
blood under different or hyphenated names, and were later attempting to donate using just 
one part of the hyphenated last name.” 98, 99 
 
ARC received its most recent citation in January 2012, resulting in yet another FDA-
imposed fine. Indeed, given the scale of ARC’s operations, such lapses in management could 
yield grave consequences for the security of both the domestic blood reserve and blood products 
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shipped internationally. Despite these risks, however, it is unclear whether ARC resorts to 
contingency screening guidelines to follow in the event of a public health emergency. 
Nevertheless, in 2006, the U.S. Senate, recognizing that ARC “supplies blood to approximately 
one-half the Nation's hospitals, operates the only blood system with the capacity to deliver blood 
anywhere and anytime it is needed, and is the only non-governmental organization with 
mandated primary agency responsibilities under the National Response Plan,” solicited CDC to 
support ARC’s Biomedical Technology Assurance Initiative. 100 This initiative, which outlines 
strategies for safeguarding blood supplies from cyber-security and biological threats, draws 
further support from CDC in the form of funding for additional biosurveillance, capacity-
building, and stockpile activities. 
100
 
5.2.3 America’s Blood Centers 
Founded in 1962, ABC represents the largest network of nonprofit blood collection agencies in 
North America, encompassing some 600 centers in 45 U.S. states and Quebec, Canada; these 
centers, in turn, supply blood (including cord blood), bone marrow, and stem cells to nearly 
3,500 hospitals and medical institutions. 
101
 Indeed, the scope of these operations qualifies ABC, 
alongside ARC, as one of the leading contributors to the American blood reserve. ABC is unique 
in that it subscribes to a community-based approach to blood banking: giving local patients in 
need primary access to blood products collected within their community, and only then 
distributing excess supplies to other high-need locations. In order to accomplish these tasks, 
ABC maintains working relationships with several government agencies, collaborating regularly 
with HHS, FDA’s Blood Product Advisory Committee, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the Department of Transportation to ensure that the U.S. blood reserve is 
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both safe and adequately supplied. 
102
 To ensure safety, ABC complies with FDA-mandated 
guidelines for screening blood, performing a total of thirteen tests on all units; of these, eleven 
detect infectious bloodborne pathogens such as HIV, HBV, HCV, HTLV-I/II, WNV, and 
syphilis. 
103
 ABC centers also adhere to FDA’s deferral guidelines, nearly always discarding 
reactive donations and offering consultations to deferred donors. 
103
 
Like ARC and AABB, ABC’s other work also extends into the related domains of 
medical resource distribution. In this vein, it has developed several software applications to 
facilitate blood product management and surveillance. One of these, an online tool called 
Stoplight, tracks blood supply availability at member centers both in the U.S. and Canada. The 
Foundation for America’s Blood Centers, a nonprofit partner of ABC, is also financing the 
development of three additional blood management systems: HL7 Software, a standardized 
interface that streamlines data exchanges between blood centers and transfusion centers; 
Appropriate Inventory Management, a program that enables hospitals to monitor blood 
availability and patient outcomes; and a radio frequency identification system that tracks blood 
products at every step of the supply chain. 
104
 In keeping with its philosophy of community-
based blood banking, ABC has also created the Resource Sharing Exchange for its member 
centers, an Internet-based inventory of available blood supplies. 
102
 
In addition to maintaining an extensive infrastructure dedicated to blood product 
distribution, ABC also contributes to numerous emergency preparedness efforts. As a member of 
AABB’s ITF, for example, ABC collaborates with multiple public- and private-sector entities to 
respond to incidents that affect the nation’s blood supply (see section 5.2.1 for further details) 
such as influenza pandemics. 
105
 ABC’s work in the realm of influenza response also extends to 
membership in the International Blood Emergency Planning Group, an organization that focuses 
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on worldwide disaster planning. 
105 
Since 2001, ABC has partnered with DHS and HHS to devise 
new strategies for accelerating blood product delivery to high-need areas. It has, for example, 
developed a hub-and-spoke model consisting of a major blood center located near a commercial 
airport (the “hub”) supported by twelve to fifteen smaller centers nearby (the “spokes”). 105 
Furthermore, after supplying U.S. troops with blood during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, 
ABC established an agreement with DoD whereby DoD may solicit blood support during 
military, humanitarian, or peacekeeping operations (known as “contingency operations”). 105 
5.2.4 World Health Organization 
WHO is an agency of the United Nations (UN) that concentrates on issues of international public 
health. In that capacity, it offers technical assistance in implementing health interventions, 
influences research agendas, and provides evidence-based policy recommendations. More 
specifically, its work also extends to the realms of infectious disease surveillance, emergency 
preparedness, and blood product safety. As delineated in its International Health Regulations and 
Constitution, WHO does reserve legal authority to require UN members to report and respond to 
global health risks. 
106
 As a member state of the UN, therefore, the U.S. is an active contributor 
to international public health response activities. 
WHO conducts extensive disease surveillance activities worldwide, overseeing a global 
“network of networks” that pulls data from government institutions, universities, the media, 
NGOs (including ARC), electronic discussion sites such as ProMed and Sentiweb, and military 
resources (including GEIS). 
107
 WHO then integrates these data into its Global Outbreak Alert & 
Response Network (GOARN), “a technical collaboration of existing institutions and networks 
who pool human and technical resources for the rapid identification, confirmation and response 
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to outbreaks of international importance.” 108 GOARN tracks the emergence of twenty-one 
pathogens, including several bloodborne viruses: HBV, HCV, dengue virus, Ebola virus, 
Marburg virus, Lassa virus, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus, and yellow fever virus. 
109
 
WHO, in turn, recommends mandatory HIV, HBV, HCV, and syphilis screening for all blood 
products collected worldwide, as well as contingency screening guidelines to implement during 
public health emergencies: 
110
  
 
“In emergency situations in which blood and blood components are needed urgently, but 
are not readily available from blood inventory, screening with rapid/simple single-use 
assays could be used to obtain results quickly and enable blood to be released for clinical 
use in consultation with the prescribing clinician. Wherever possible, however, the blood 
sample should be retested as soon as possible using an [enzyme immunoassay] or another 
assay used routinely for blood screening in the laboratory in order to check the validity of 
the test results. Any discrepant results should immediately be investigated further and 
corrective action taken, including communication with the clinician who has prescribed 
the blood. Countries should work towards systems that avoid these situations.” 111 
 
The aforementioned surveillance initiatives are demonstrative of WHO’s commitments 
both to hemovigilance and strengthening the blood management infrastructures of its member 
nations. Between May of 1975 and May of 2010, WHO released five separate resolutions 
pertaining to blood product acquisition, screening, and transfusion. Notable recommendations 
highlighted in these resolutions include: making blood safety a national public health priority, 
promoting non-remunerative donation practices, implementing national policies to guarantee 
efficient blood product allocation, improving medical training, and encouraging timely reporting 
of adverse transfusion events, donor deferrals, and best practices. 
112
 WHO, with respect to the 
last recommendation, has regularly solicited blood management data from its member states 
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since 1998 via questionnaire; the results are subsequently uploaded to the Global Database on 
Blood Safety (GDBS) in order to “provide information on the current status of blood transfusion 
services, assess country needs in improving blood safety, formulate strategic recommendations 
to countries, plan and implement activities and evaluate progress.” 113 In order to strengthen 
working relationships between stakeholders in the realm of international blood product 
management, WHO established the Global Blood Safety Network (GBSN) (formerly the Global 
Collaboration for Blood Safety), a partnership between “WHO Collaborating Centres, expert 
panel members, NGOs in official relations and key implementing partners for blood safety.” 114 
The collective data gathered from GDBS, GBSN, and GOARN often inform WHO’s public 
health response strategies, which are coordinated through the JW Lee Centre for Strategic Health 
Operations; specific commissions include organizing the medical response to the Indian Ocean 
earthquake and tsunami, an outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in Angola, and Hurricane 
Katrina. 
115
 
5.3 SUMMARY OF AMERICAN BLOOD PRODUCT MANAGEMENT 
POLICIES 
Blood products collected in the U.S. must traverse a complex regulatory pipeline before being 
put to therapeutic use. Federal players in this infrastructure include HHS, DHS, CDC, FDA, and 
DoD. During public health emergencies, FEMA charges each of these agencies with the task of 
expediting blood product acquisition, screening, and distribution as dictated by ESF #8 of the 
NRF. Meanwhile, non-governmental contributors to the blood supply pipeline include AABB, 
ARC, ABC, hospitals, and independent blood banks. Though all of these agencies span both the 
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public and private sectors, they collaborate frequently to conduct disease surveillance, advance 
research in the field of transfusion medicine, enforce the guidelines ensuring that the blood 
reserve is free of harmful pathogens, and strengthen the policies that govern blood product 
management during times of peace and emergency. WHO, of which the U.S. is an active 
member, directs similar activities on a global scale, encouraging international partnership in 
matters of blood product regulation and dissemination. 
Over the years, in cognizance of the public health hazards stemming from an unsafe 
blood reserve, the aforementioned organizations have executed innumerable activities to ensure 
blood security. These activities, which are diverse in scope and nature, span several categories: 
hemovigilance, which includes screening measures and disease surveillance; evaluation, which 
refers to the software systems and professional networks seeking to improve patient care with 
respect to transfusions; supply chain analysis, which encompasses the logistics of blood product 
delivery; and research, which includes those activities aiming to develop new, innovative 
methods of securing the blood reserve. These endeavors have proven to be fruitful despite the 
complexities associated with inter-agency collaboration, maintaining America’s blood 
management infrastructure, and responding to pathogenic threats. As a result, the U.S. blood 
reserve is safer now than ever before. Given recent failures in blood product management during 
public health emergencies, however, the true effectiveness of current policies remains to be 
determined. 
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6.0  BLOOD PRODUCTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 
Public health emergencies – which may encompass events as diverse as disease outbreaks, 
nuclear and radiological accidents, natural catastrophes, or acts of terror – frequently raise the 
question of proper resource allocation. This issue is especially germane to disasters that deplete 
communities of human capital, medical equipment, or the infrastructure required to deliver 
supplies needed for recovery. Kapur and Smith, for instance, point out that during public health 
emergencies, “international organizations, countries, or local governments may possess the 
emergency supplies and personnel for a region in crisis, [but] on many occasions they are unable 
to deliver this assistance in a timely or coordinated manner.” 116 
The emergencies described above would undoubtedly amplify the complexities of blood 
product management. ESF #8 charges HHS and its subsidiaries – CDC, FDA, and NDMS – with 
most of the responsibility for directing blood product acquisition and distribution efforts during 
such events. 
52 Additional sources of support include AABB’s ITF, which helps publicize 
imminent blood shortages; DoD, which may supplement existing blood products with supplies 
from the military reserve; and the Department of Justice, which offers security for SNS 
deployments and blood product supplies during transportation. 
52
 The nonprofit entities described 
previously – ARC and ABC – would also contribute to collection efforts and disaster assistance. 
The following section includes an analysis of blood product use during the aftermath of 
past public health emergencies, and identifies and explores blood product-specific challenges 
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that public health officials, HCWs, and policymakers must account for when determining the 
optimal course of action to take during an emergency: surpluses and shortages, the logistics of 
processing and screening, and the impact of emergencies on blood product delivery. This section 
also includes a brief case study of blood product management efforts after the September 11
th
 
attacks, and extrapolates the lessons learned to encompass future emergencies. 
6.1 SEPTEMBER 11TH: A CASE STUDY OF MISMANAGEMENT 
The events of September 11
th
, 2001 are among the costliest public health emergencies on 
American soil in recent memory. The 9/11 attacks also presented public health authorities, 
emergency responders, and government officials with considerable challenges with respect to 
blood product management. GAO reports that “large numbers of Americans are willing to donate 
blood in response to disasters.” 24 Smaller-scale emergencies in the years prior to 9/11 – the 
bombings in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the shootings at Columbine High School in 1999, for 
instance – certainly confirm this. Though these events resulted in temporary blood product 
deficits, local donors and blood collection agencies managed to meet the demand for additional 
products without soliciting assistance from state or federal authorities. 
117
 In fact, the Oklahoma 
Blood Institute eventually shipped some 7,000 surplus units of blood collected after the 
bombings to other parts of the country. 
117
 The aftermath of September 11
th
, however, left the 
U.S.’ blood management infrastructure in near-total disarray. Immediately after the attacks, 
countless individuals instantly volunteered to give blood. Subsequently, HHS, ABC, and ARC 
issued simultaneous public requests for blood; as a result, collection agencies amassed some 
572,000 units of blood in the weeks following 9/11, nearly a 40 percent increase from earlier 
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monthly averages. 
24 
Given the emergency at hand, FDA also sanctioned blood screening by 
volunteers instead of trained HCWs, interstate exchanges of non-licensed blood products, and 
transfusions of blood that had not been fully tested. 
117
 
Although certain public health emergencies may require additional blood products, the 
9/11 attacks proved to be an exception because there were very few victims who needed 
transfusions; in fact, most survivors presented with burns and inhalation injuries. 
117
 
Consequently, HCWs used only 258 of the roughly 572,000 units of blood to treat survivors of 
the attacks. 
117
 While approximately two-thirds of the donations collected entered the American 
blood reserve, blood banks ultimately discarded 208,000 units, a nearly 14 percent increase in 
the rate of blood product disposal due to expiration. 
117
 The massive influx of blood products 
also exacerbated the crisis by creating logistical challenges. Dr. Paul Schmidt reports, “Platelets 
ordinarily harvested from whole blood were lost to use. A processing backlog delayed the testing 
of the fresh platelets needed for patients with thrombocytopenia. At one hospital, where 
volunteers helped screen donors, 11 percent of the blood collected could not be used because of 
errors in the screening process.” 117 Such waste ultimately generated $5 million in financial 
losses for blood banks. 
24 
The federal government, too, lost nearly $500,000 after compensating 
blood collection agencies for processing the surplus of donations. 
117
 
Although the surge in the American blood reserve after 9/11 engendered major logistical 
ordeals, analysis of entering blood products revealed more alarming trends. Many of the 
individuals who stepped forward to give blood were first-time donors, a pattern commonly 
observed after many disasters. 
118
 Dodd, et al., however, report that the incidence of HBV, HCV, 
HIV, and HTLV-I/II infections is 2.4 times higher among first-time donors compared to repeat 
donors. 
119
  The aftermath of 9/11 certainly mirrored this phenomenon, with blood banks 
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observing a nearly three-fold increase in donations testing positive for HBV, HCV, and HIV. 
118
 
Though collection agencies discarded reactive donations, the increased pathogenic load in the 
blood reserve combined with relaxed screening guidelines undoubtedly elevated the risk of 
acquiring a blood-transmissible infection during this period. 
Robert Jones, the president of New York Blood Center, noted, “People needed to be with 
one another, friends, neighbors and strangers. Blood donation sites gave them that opportunity 
along with something personal to do for the cause. As the response was disproportionate to the 
medical need, the social value of blood donation at once became far more important to the 
community than its medical value.” 117 The repercussions emerging from such immense public 
altruism, however, ultimately proved detrimental to the blood industry and the efforts of agencies 
that collected blood after the attacks. ARC, for example, confronted much criticism for its blood 
management strategies, and subsequently underwent major administrative changes as a result. 
117
 
The blood industry as a whole, too, faced considerable public distrust after its mismanagement of 
donations after 9/11. 
6.2 BLOOD DEMAND, SURPLUSES, AND DEFICITS 
CBER defines a biologic as medically necessary if “it is used to treat, cure, mitigate, prevent, or 
diagnose a serious or life-threatening disease or medical condition and there is no other available 
source or alternative therapy.” 120 By this logic, it follows that blood products were medically 
unnecessary following the 9/11 attacks. However, such difficulties, while certainly burdensome 
to the U.S.’ blood management infrastructure, are no less challenging to address than those 
associated with blood product shortages. NBRDC reports that the number of transfusions 
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performed in the U.S. increases 6 percent annually, a trend likely to persist due to an aging 
population, an increase in surgical procedures performed, and growing use of medical 
technologies such as chemotherapy and organ transplantation. 
121
 In light of the growing demand 
for blood, such shortages, which occur seasonally in the U.S., may force hospitals to begin 
rationing blood products or cancel surgeries until emergency management personnel can resolve 
the crisis at hand. 
Given the short shelf lives of most blood products, maintaining an adequately stocked 
inventory and ensuring minimal waste presents blood banks with a considerable challenge. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to predict just how much or little blood a public health emergency will 
require. Injuries stemming from building collapses, for instance, typically do not require blood 
transfusions. On the other hand, a large-scale nuclear disaster that subjects a population to 
significant radioactive exposure will almost certainly require large quantities of blood products – 
specifically, platelets – to treat victims of acute radiation syndrome or traumatic injuries. Recent 
models of a nuclear detonation in a city such as Washington, D.C. project that as many as 30,000 
individuals will require specific care for bone marrow suppression; that is, a decrease in cells 
needed for immunity, clotting, and oxygen carriage. 
122
 Because clinicians require blood 
products to successfully this condition, the need for blood products – specifically, platelets – will 
increase dramatically. The shelf life of donated platelets, however, is a mere five days. 
123
 The 
high turnover rate thus necessitates consistent donations to maintain the blood supply pipeline. 
Unfortunately, a detonation and comparable large-scale emergencies would likely incapacitate 
many healthy individuals – the source of these donations – and thus render them incapable of 
providing much-needed platelets, while continuing to amplify the demand for blood. On a 
similar note, several potential agents of bioterrorism include blood-transmissible viruses: dengue 
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virus, yellow fever virus, Ebola virus, and Marburg virus. Contamination of the blood reserve or 
widespread infection by any of these hemorrhagic fever viruses could rapidly diminish available 
supplies of safe blood products. 
6.3 EMERGENCY BLOOD DISTRIBUTION AND SCREENING 
Public health emergencies such as disease outbreaks or acts of bioterrorism would have 
relatively little impact on the physical infrastructure required to deliver blood products in a 
timely manner; namely, vehicles, roads, and storage facilities. Natural disasters, however, along 
with certain man-made disasters (e.g. nuclear terrorism), could quickly render these critical 
components of the blood product supply chain inoperative. Immediately after the 2003 
earthquake in Bam, Iran, for instance, blood collection agencies amassed 108,985 units of blood, 
but, due to a deficient delivery scheme and poor transportation capabilities, distributed only 
21,347 to hospitals across the country. 
124
 Kerman Province, the site of the disaster, received 
only 1,231 (1.3%) of all the units collected. 
124
 Given the challenges associated with importing 
blood products from outside locations, some blood banks in the U.S. elect to maintain a frozen 
reserve of pre-screened blood. However, thawing numerous blood units during an emergency is a 
time-consuming process and would likely serve as a poor strategy in the context of a mass-
casualty emergency. ABC maintains an ad-hoc, hub-and-spoke model for impromptu blood 
deliveries (see section 5.2.3), but the efficacy of this approach during a large-scale disaster 
remains unclear, particularly in underserved regions lacking access to multiple blood centers. 
Differing management protocols between collection agencies and medical institutions could also 
hinder efforts to launch a concerted response to the emergency at hand. 
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Even more pressing than the challenge of coordinating distribution is the issue of 
ensuring the safety of newly collected donations. The full screening process for blood products 
collected in the U.S. typically takes two days. Although FDA reserves the authority to expedite 
blood product screening in the event of an emergency (as seen after the 9/11 attacks), this 
approach may actually generate significant logistical difficulties and endanger the safety of 
patients being treated with those products. Furthermore, the U.S. lacks rapid diagnostic tests for 
certain bloodborne viruses that are also prime candidates for weaponization. Even if the blood 
products on hand are pathogen-free, shortages in the equipment needed to administer them may 
create further delays. In addition to screening blood for infectious pathogens, blood management 
agencies must also contend with the issue of cross-matching the blood types of donors and 
recipients. Type O-negative blood, which HCWs may use to safely treat any individual, is also 
one of the rarest phenotypes of blood and thus likely to be in short supply during an emergency. 
Unless blood collection agencies and HCWs characterize each incoming donation, however, 
transfusion recipients run the risk of developing potentially dangerous autoimmune responses. 
6.4 CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS 
As the primary administrators of therapeutic care during public health emergencies, HCWs and 
hospitals play a crucial role in addressing the medical repercussions of disasters, which includes 
administering available blood supplies to disaster victims. The Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) charges participating hospitals – those receiving 
reimbursements from HHS or CMS – with screening and stabilizing any individual who requires 
emergency care. 
125
 Originally enacted to prevent hospitals from “dumping” (i.e. inappropriately 
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transferring) uninsured patients, this law nevertheless yields important consequences for 
emergency preparedness at medical institutions. During presidentially-declared national 
emergencies, HHS may waive EMTALA requirements, leaving hospitals free to move or treat 
patients in accordance with their respective disaster management protocols, or with plans 
developed by state or local authorities. 
126
 After Hurricane Katrina, for instance, HHS issued an 
EMTALA waiver to facilitate the medical response to the disaster, during which time affected 
hospitals could freely transfer hurricane victims to other institutions. 
126 
However, because 
EMTALA waivers are valid for only 72 hours following non-pandemic emergencies, Louisiana 
hospitals were quickly forced to once again comply with EMTALA or risk incurring hefty fines. 
126
 Furthermore, state and local incidents that are not presidentially-declared emergencies do not 
qualify for EMTALA waivers. As seen after 9/11, however, certain disasters could drastically 
escalate the demand for medical personnel and resources. The ability to move patients from a 
hospital affected by disaster to one that is better equipped with blood and other medical 
countermeasures is crucial to meeting this demand. Given the steep costs associated with 
maintaining a sufficiently stocked blood reserve (see section 4.4) and the difficulties of rationing 
limited blood supplies, EMTALA appears to unduly burden HCWs attempting to respond to a 
public health emergency. 
A community in the midst of a disaster may also suffer from a shortage of available 
medical professionals, depending on the nature of the disaster at hand. In fact, many institutions 
in the U.S. already lack an adequate number of medical technologists to handle laboratory needs 
during emergencies. 
127
 Such a deficit in medical expertise will greatly undermine the medical 
response to a major catastrophe involving many victims or a concurrent shortage in blood 
products. With fewer available professionals, victims will remain untreated or possibly receive 
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suboptimal treatment. In a hypothetical case study of a pandemic of bloodborne influenza 
infections in the U.S., Zimrin and Hess further describe the effect that a disaster might have on a 
hospital, with respect to blood product management: 
 
“In the hospital transfusion services, maintaining staff for all work shifts will become 
increasingly difficult. Here, the loss of specific individuals, such as medical directors, 
supervisors, and lead technologists, will alter patterns of workflow that are written into 
policies and procedures and programmed into blood bank information systems. As 
remaining technologists are asked to assume responsibilities not usually their own, role 
confusion will occur. This will be especially evident in transfusion services where a 
certain degree of obsessiveness is a basic job requirement, and the flexibility needed to 
deal with many kinds of stressful situations may be constitutionally lacking.” 128 
 
However, even if a community in crisis has enough trained professionals on hand to 
mitigate the effects of a disaster, HCWs still face increased health hazards simply by virtue of 
their work. Needlestick injuries, for instance, represent a significant mode of transmission for 
bloodborne viruses and pose a regular threat to HCWs safety on a regular basis. It is estimated 
that between 600,000 and 800,000 such injuries occur in American medical facilities each year, 
generating upwards of $500 million in healthcare costs. 
129
 Given the inevitable surge in 
individuals requiring blood products during a public health emergency, the likelihood of HCW 
injury or exposure to bloodborne pathogens is correspondingly higher. 
Certain medical institutions have also created contingency plans for allocating blood 
products in the event of a shortage. The Yale-New Haven Hospital in New Haven, Connecticut, 
for example, typically carries 300 units of blood and distributes an average of 70 units daily for 
medical use. 
130
 In response to seasonal depletions in the blood supply, planners at Yale-New 
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Haven Hospital have developed an emergency distribution strategy that conserves units of liquid 
blood while maintaining a frozen reserve of 200 O-negative units. Depending on the severity of 
the shortage at hand, hospital personnel may cancel elective procedures, ration blood units to 
high-need patients, or thaw frozen units to ensure optimal blood product allocation. 
130
 Proper 
execution of such plans, however, depends heavily on a highly trained staff, the availability of 
electrical power, and functional medical equipment. Unfortunately, such resources may not be 
readily accessible during a public health emergency. 
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7.0  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
NIMS defines preparedness as "a continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, 
exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination 
during incident response." 
131
 As such, preparedness represents a critical determinant of the 
public’s health. Given the importance of blood and its derivatives during the wake of an 
emergency, it is imperative that both public- and private-sector authorities streamline the U.S.’ 
blood management infrastructure so they are better-equipped to address the needs of local 
responders, HCWs, and communities in crisis. Current guidelines for blood collection, screening, 
and delivery appear sufficient in the absence of an emergency, as evidenced by the increasingly 
infrequent incidence of transfusion-transmitted viral infections in the U.S. These same 
guidelines, however, present significant obstacles to medical response coordinators attempting to 
address the needs of populations in crisis. 
The following sections include policy recommendations that seek to strengthen the U.S.’ 
response capabilities with respect to blood products and bloodborne viruses. These 
recommendations focus particularly on the following areas: federal provisions for blood 
products, HCWs and volunteers, disease surveillance, emergency diagnostics and research, and 
donor preparedness. 
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7.1 FEDERAL PROVISIONS FOR BLOOD PRODUCTS 
Blood products are undoubtedly lifesaving medical countermeasures, albeit ones that cannot be 
stockpiled for longer than a few weeks. Given the storage limitations and safety considerations 
associated with these commodities, the federal government should include specific provisions for 
blood product management in existing policies, laws, and emergency preparedness guidelines. 
Relevant policies might include PAHPA, NRF, PHEMCE, the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, and BARDA’s Strategic Plan. CMS and NDMS 
could also modify their reimbursement policies to offer larger restitutions to medical institutions 
purchasing extra blood in response to a public health emergency. Similarly, eliminating the 72-
hour EMTALA waiver limit could significantly reduce the onus of rationing limited blood 
supplies during hospital surges. Extending these benefits to disasters at the state and local level 
(instead of restricting them to presidentially-declared disasters) could further alleviate the 
financial and logistical burdens associated with emergency blood product dissemination. 
Additionally, in light of the impromptu measures taken after 9/11 – volunteer-performed 
screenings, interstate exchanges of unlicensed products, and transfusions of unscreened blood – 
FDA and HHS should implement more stringent emergency blood management regulations in 
the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. In the interest of time constraints during emergencies, 
FDA might also consider devising contingency screening guidelines to follow after disasters 
involving a surge in blood product demand. Additionally, since the vast majority of the 
American blood reserve originates from nonprofit collectors, further federal collaboration with 
nonprofit entities is necessary. FEMA, HHS, and FDA, for instance, could work with ABC, 
ARC, and AABB to create a cohesive blood management plan to follow in the event of a public 
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health emergency. Such collaborations should ideally include state and local authorities, 
particularly those representing underserved or under-equipped regions. 
7.2 HEALTHCARE WORKERS AND MEDICAL VOLUNTEERS 
Successful blood product administration and hospital preparedness depends on the physicians, 
nurses, and medical technicians responsible for executing emergency protocols. Medical 
institutions, therefore, could certainly benefit from regular participation in disaster training 
exercises that include a blood product management component. The federal government’s 
Hospital Preparedness Program could serve as a source of funding for such initiatives. 
Partnerships with local businesses, organizations, or pharmaceutical providers could also provide 
hospitals with access to resources in short supply during emergencies. 
In order to facilitate emergency operations, hospitals should also review staffing 
procedures to ensure that enough transfusion specialists are on hand during an emergency; final 
staffing assignments should be commensurate with the size and special needs of the population at 
risk during a disaster. Medical institutions might also consider devising blood product 
conservation plans to enact during shortages, or, in order to optimize processing times, 
encourage donors to participate in plateletpheresis or erythrocytapheresis instead of whole blood 
donation. Additionally, implementing policies to reduce the number of unnecessary transfusions 
performed and the incidence of needlestick injuries would contribute to a safer workplace even 
during an emergency, thereby ensuring that hospitals do not lose staff to preventable mishaps. 
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7.3 DISEASE SURVEILLANCE 
Surveillance represents a major component of ensuring adequate preparedness with respect to 
blood products. In that vein, state and local health authorities would certainly benefit from 
federal funds dedicated to augmenting disease surveillance efforts in their jurisdictions. Granting 
particular focus to previously undiagnosed or chronic HBV, HCV, and HIV infections would not 
only enable local health institutions to identify and meet the medical needs of their constituents, 
but also help ascertain the threat that viral pathogens pose to blood product security. 
In addition to boosting surveillance capacities, streamlining and integrating existing 
software systems could ensure a more efficient and informed response to public health 
emergencies. Current blood management systems include BASIS, DBSS, NHSN, TDC, UDC, 
Donor Hemovigilance System, HL7 Software, Appropriate Inventory Management, and 
Stoplight. Additionally, WHO tracks blood product use on a global scale via GDBS, GEIS, and 
GOARN. Participation is mostly voluntary, with a limited number of medical institutions 
contributing information to these largely unlinked systems. Authorities might consider first 
consolidating these disparate surveillance modules into a central hub where all U.S. medical 
institutions can access real-time, relevant information: locations experiencing blood shortages, 
emerging pathogenic threats, or optimal transportation routes for blood product delivery, for 
example. Following up systemic integration with increased hospital participation is critical to 
ensuring the utility and success of expanded surveillance activities. 
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7.4 EMERGENCY DIAGNOSTICS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Maintaining constant bio- and hemovigilance is an important component of ensuring 
preparedness with respect to bloodborne threats, but when such threats come to pass, rapid 
identification of and response to the agents responsible becomes equally important. Given the 
relative facility with which bloodborne pathogens move from place to place, it is imperative that 
the U.S. is able to safeguard the national blood supply from non-endemic infectious agents such 
as malaria or dengue virus. Therefore, NIH and CDC should support research initiatives aiming 
to develop rapid diagnostic tests for existing and emerging bloodborne pathogens, especially 
viruses. Other important areas of research include improving the effectiveness of existing 
medical countermeasures which, unlike most blood products, may be stockpiled: blood 
substitutes, cytokines, and hematopoietic factors. 
Expanding laboratory capabilities to accommodate the challenges associated with 
emergency management is another potential area of improvement. Well-equipped laboratories 
could be of immense assistance to medical institutions in the event of a blood product surge, 
helping to screen donations and thus ensure the safety of available blood products. In this vein, 
CDC might consider incorporating more laboratories at the state and local levels into LRN, 
particularly those serving resource-poor or vulnerable populations. 
7.5 DONOR PREPAREDNESS 
Past emergencies indicate that the public is willing and able to donate blood during times of 
crisis. However, mass appeals for blood donations immediately after a disaster could quickly 
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overwhelm the U.S.’ blood management infrastructure and damage the public’s perception of the 
blood banking industry, as seen after the events of 9/11. Prior to issuing a mass appeal, therefore, 
blood collection agencies should first consult with each other to assess the need for blood and 
only then devise a strategy for communicating with the public to solicit donations. Collection 
agencies should also consider collaborating with local medical institutions and health 
departments to conduct outreach activities to educate the public about the role they play in 
emergency response with respect to blood products. Such initiatives would help create a well-
informed population that understands when to donate blood and how to lessen the risk of 
experiencing an adverse event during donation, thereby reducing blood product waste during 
public health emergencies. Finally, local emergency management agencies can take additional 
steps to guarantee the well-being of their jurisdictions. Health departments or individual 
healthcare providers, for example, could maintain a registry of individuals with certain medical 
conditions, such as hemophilia, sickle-cell anemia, or thalassemia major. Awareness of these 
special needs would certainly help optimize efforts aimed at allocating blood products efficiently 
during a public health emergency. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this investigation was to explore the policies governing blood product 
management in the U.S., and determine whether current policies include adequate provisions for 
responding to blood product needs during public health emergencies. The investigation revealed 
that the responsibilities of coordinating blood product acquisition, processing, and delivery span 
both the public and nonprofit sectors. Despite the importance of blood as a medical 
countermeasure, nonprofit organizations and government authorities at the federal, state, and 
local have yet to develop a cohesive blood management strategy in response to community needs 
during an emergency. One of the most important aspects of blood product management is 
ensuring that collected products are free of bloodborne pathogens, especially transfusion-
transmitted viruses. Notable among these viruses are HIV, HBV, and HCV, which cause 
infections with significant socioeconomic and clinical burdens. 
This investigation began with a description of the importance of blood and its derivatives 
before discussing the epidemiology and associated economic impacts of HIV, HBV, and HCV 
infections. It then examined the contents of the American blood reserve, delineated current 
pathogen screening policies, and analyzed the economics of the blood banking industry. Next, 
the study parsed the U.S.’ complex regulatory framework for overseeing blood product use, 
identifying various agencies in the federal and nonprofit sectors that handle blood, assessing their 
roles with respect to viral threats and emergency response, and examining the policies governing 
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blood use on a day-to-day basis. This analysis revealed that despite significant investments of 
money, resources, and personnel, critical shortcomings in the U.S.’ current approach to blood 
product management nevertheless remain: difficulties managing blood surpluses and deficits, a 
propensity towards blood product waste, a cumbersome screening process, poor communication 
between federal authorities and nonprofit agencies, and challenges in blood product use in 
medical settings. The study subsequently explored the repercussions of these shortcomings in the 
context of public health emergencies, considering past emergencies and discussing specific 
implications for blood banks, donors, HCWs, and medical institutions. Based on these findings, 
the investigation concluded with several recommendations addressing deficiencies in federal 
policies, surveillance activities, research initiatives, hospital preparedness, and donor education. 
Blood product management represents a unique facet of emergency preparedness. 
Because blood products originate from individuals the local level, they are community assets in 
the truest sense. Without a resilient infrastructure in place by which health authorities can 
acquire and distribute such assets efficiently and conscientiously, the communities from which 
blood products emerge will remain vulnerable to public health disasters. It is the position of this 
investigation that in light of their status as community assets, successful blood product 
management requires significantly more cooperation and collaboration between federal, state, 
and local public health authorities in order to enhance emergency preparedness in the U.S. 
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APPENDIX 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
AABB American Association of Blood Banks (formerly) 
ABC  America’s Blood Centers 
ACBTSA Advisory Committee on Blood and Tissue Safety and Availability 
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
ARC  American Red Cross 
ASBP Armed Services Blood Program 
BASIS Blood Availability and Safety Information System 
CBER Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CJD  Creutzfeld-Jakob disease 
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
DBSS Defense Blood Standard System 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
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EMTALA Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act 
ESF  Emergency Support Function 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GBSN  Global Blood Safety Network 
GDBS Global Database on Blood Safety 
GEIS Global Emerging Infections Surveillance & Response System 
GOARN Global Outbreak Alert & Response Network 
HBV   Hepatitis B virus 
HCV  Hepatitis C virus 
HCW  Healthcare worker 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HTLV-I/II Human lymphotropic virus I and II 
IDU   Intravenous drug user 
ITF Interorganizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism 
LRN Laboratory Response Network 
MSM  Men who have sex with men 
NAT   Nucleic acid test 
NBCUS National Blood Collection & Utilization Survey 
NBE  National Blood Exchange 
NBDRC National Blood Data Resource Center 
 62 
NDMS National Disaster Medical System 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NIH  National Institutes of Health 
NIMS National Inventory Management System 
NHSN National Healthcare Safety Network 
NRF  National Response Framework 
PAHPA Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
PHEMCE Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy 
RBC  Red blood cell 
SNS  Strategic National Stockpile 
TDC Thalassemia Data and Blood Specimen Collection project 
UDC Universal Data Collection system 
UN  United Nations 
WHO  World Health Organization 
WNV  West Nile virus 
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